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One of the objectives of IIASAYs Energy Systems Program is t o  improve 
the methodology of medium- and long-range forecasting in the areas of 
the energy market and energy use, demands, supply opportunities and 
constraints. This is commonly accomplished with models that capture and 
put into equations the numerous relationships and feedbacks characterizing 
the operation of an economic system or parts of it. Such an approach 
encounters many difficulties, which are linked to the extreme complexity 
of the system and the fairly short-term variation of the parameters and 
even of the equations used. Consequently, these models lend themselves 
to short- and perhaps medium-range predictions, but normally fail to  be 
useful for predictions over a period of about 50 years, the time horizon 
that the Energy Systems Program has chosen for study. 
Following the current scheme of attacking similar problems in the 
physical sciences, we have left aside all details and interactions, and have 
attempted a macroscopic description of the system via the discovery of 
long-term invariants. Heuristically, this approach is certainly not new. In a 
broad sense, the sciences can be seen as a systematic search for invariants. 
This work is dedicated to  the empirical testing and theoretical for- 
mulation of an invariant, the logistic learning curve, as it applies to  the 
structural evolution of energy systems and systems related to energy, such 
as coal mining. The great success of the model in organizing past data, and 
the insensitivity to  major political and economic perturbations of the 
structures obtained seem t o  lend great predictive power to  this invariant. 
This Research Report represents only part of the work done at 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, under a grant 
from the Volkswagenwerk Foundation, FRG, on the potential of logistic 
analysis in describing energy systems. It is completely documented in the 
Administrative Report to the foundation entitled "The Dynamics of Energy 
Systems and the Logistic Substitution Model" (Marchetti et al. 1978). 
The present paper reproduces the descriptive part in Section B of the 
Administrative Report. The software is described by Nakicenovic (1 979). 
As for the theoretical treatment in Section C by Peterka, a new issue of 
"Macrodynamics of Technological Change: Market Penetration by New 
Technologies" is available (Peterka 1 977). Fleck's contribution to Section C 
on the regularity of market penetration is part of his forthcoming doctoral 
dissertation at the University of Karlsruhe. Section A of the Administrative 
Report is the executive summary. 
SUMMARY 
Information, material, and energy are the basic constituents of civilization, 
and it is most natural that we should try to assess their respective roles 
and internal mechanisms. The question of energy has been enjoying much 
attention lately, partly because of the very successful move by the oil cartel 
in 1973. The political consequences and the promotional infrastructure of 
that move have generated a highly emotional atmosphere, inimical to an 
objective appreciation of the facts. In this study in IIASA's Energy Systems 
Program, we have attempted to leave aside emotions and ad hoc interpre- 
tations. Sticking only to  the facts, we have tried to  find out if they have 
an internal order of their own, or, in the terminology of physics, if they 
can be described phenomenologically. We find that this is possible. 
Our initial working hypothesis was that primary energies, such as 
wood, coal, oil, gas, and nuclear energy, are just technologies competing 
for a market. Consequently, market penetration analysis, as it has been 
developed by Mansfield (1 961) and many others, should be applicable. In 
order to test the power and the limits of this analysis, we worked on as 
many examples as could be used, on three different levels of aggregation: 
Primary energy inputs for the world as a whole 
Primary energy inputs for individual nations or clusters of nations 
Energy subsystems, such as electric utilities 
A total o f  about 300 cases were examined. Since the goodness of 
fit was consistently high, the examples in this report have been chosen for 
mainly didactic reasons. The United States is particularly well represented, 
largely because of the quality and detail of U.S. statistics. A good repre- 
sentation of FRG data was also attempted. Since supertankers have made 
the energy system a world system, the case of the world as a whole was 
given special attention for its political and resource implications. Although 
the main thrust of our analysis has been t o  provide a simple, objective, 
and internally consistent description of the past, we made a projection of 
the future, as it is described by the equations, and commented on it. But 
given that our projections are often different from what one has come to  
expect according t o  current wisdom, our attempt has t o  be considered 
exploratory. After all, it is perfectly legitimate in scientific research t o  test 
the limits of a newly discovered tool by extending its range of application 
beyond its "natural" bounds. 
There is another important point to  be mentioned, regarding possible 
control of the process of substitution of one technology for another. No 
technology can start from zero without external financial help. The mag- 
nitude of the initial external investment determines the initial conditions 
for the substitution, and may considerably accelerate the substitution 
process (or delay it, if the investment is too small), especially if the new 
technology is profitable but requires high investments. The example of 
nuclear energy is treated in some detail. 
On the whole, we believe that the basic objective of this work has 
been fulfilled: we explored the field experimentally, showing the great 
efficiency of our model in organizing data. In doing so, we have presumably 
generated more problems than we have solved, which is a good indication 
that we have been plowing a fertile field. 
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Four years ago, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
began a study of energy systems using the techniques of market penetra- 
tion analysis. The basic hypothesis - which has proved very fruitful and 
powerful - is that primary energies, secondary energies, and energy distri- 
bution systems are just different technologies competing for a market and 
should behave accordingly. 
Previous analysis of market competition had always been performed 
for only two competitors. But it is a peculiarity of energy systems over 
the last hundred years that most of the time more than two competitors 
took important shares of the market. Thus, we had to  modify the original 
rules by introducing new constraints that permitted us to  deal with more 
complicated cases. These constraints were defined empirically from a 
few cases, but proved very successful in dealing with virtually all the 
cases that we analyzed. A mathematical formulation of the substitution 
process is given below and the manual for the software package is given in 
Nakicenovic (1 979). 
2 THE LOGISTIC FUNCTION AND SUBSTITUTION DYNAMICS 
Substitution of a new way for the old way of satisfying a given need has 
been the subject of a large number of studies. One general finding is that 
almost all binary substitution processes, expressed in fractional terms, 
follow characteristic S-shaped curves, which have been used for forecasting 
further competition between the two alternative technologies or products, 
and also the final takeover by the new competitor. 
Most of the studies of technological substitution are based on the use 
of the logistic function. The logistic function, however, is not the only 
S-shaped function, but it is perhaps the most suitable one for empirical 
analysis of growth and substitution processes because of both the ease in 
interpreting the meaning of its parameters and the simplicity in estimating 
the parameters from the observed phenomena. Another S-shaped function, 
the Compertz curve, has also been frequently used, especially to describe 
population, plant, and animal growth (see, e.g., Richards 1959). 
The widespread empirical applications of the logistic function as a 
means of describing growth phenomena also originated in the studies of 
human population, biology, and chemistry. The first reference to  the 
logistic function can be found in Verhulst (1838, 1845, 1847). Pearl 
(1924, 1925) rediscovered the function and used it extensively to describe 
the growth of populations, including human population. From then on, 
numerous studies have been conducted only to  confirm the logistic 
property of most growth processes. Robertson (1 923) was the first to  use 
the function to  describe the growth process in a single organism or indi- 
vidual. Later, the function found application in work concerning bioassays 
(see e.g., Emmens 1941, Wilson and Worcester 1942, and Bergson 1944), 
and in work on the growth of bacterial cultures in a feeding solution, auto- 
catalyzed chemical reactions, and so on. 
One of the first studies that showed that technological substitution 
can be described by an S-shaped curve was the pioneering work of Griliches 
(1957) on the diffusion of the hybrid corn seed in the United States. He 
showed that hybrid corn replaced traditional corn seed in different states 
in a very similar way; the S-shaped substitution was only displaced in time 
by a few years and lasted differing lengths of time from one state to  another. 
Following the work of Griliches, Mansfield (1961) developed a model 
to  explain the rate at which firms follow an innovator. He hypothesized 
that the adoption of an innovation is positively related to  the profitability 
of employing the innovation and negatively related to  the expected invest- 
ments associated with this introduction. Mansfield substantiated the theo- 
retical implications of his model by the empirical analysis of the diffusion 
of 12 industrial innovations in four major industries. 
One of the most notable models of binary technological substitution, 
which extended Mansfield's findings, was formulated by Fisher and Pry 
(1970). This model uses the two-parameter logistic function to  describe 
the substitution process. The basic assumption postulated by Fisher and 
Pry is that once a substitution of the new for the old has progressed as far 
as a few percent, it will proceed to  completion along a logistic substitution 
curve : 
where t is the independent variable usually representing some unit of time, 
(Y and p are constants, f is the fractional market share of the new competi- 
tor, and 1 - f that of the old one. The coefficients a and 0 are sufficient 
to describe the whole substitution process. They cannot be directly ob- 
served; they can, however, be estimated from the historical data. 
Two sets of exan~ples are shown here (Figures 1 and 2) from the 
original papers of Fisher and Pry (Fisher and Pry 1970, Pry 1973). The 
logistic functions appear to give an excellent description of substitution, 
not only for very different products and technologies, but also for different 
types of economies. 
In dealing with more than two competing technologies, we have had 
to generalize the Fisher-Pry model since in such cases logistic substitution 
Year 
FIGURE 1 Technological substitution in the production of steel, turpentine, and 
paints. Source: Fisher and Pry (1970). 
Year 
FIGURE 2 Substitution of the basic oxygen furnace for open-hearth and Bessemer 
steel production. On the line in the middle, the triangles represent the FRG and the 
circles represent the USA. Source: Pry (1973). 
cannot be preserved in all phases of the substitution process. Every given 
technology undergoes three distinct substitution phases: growth, saturation, 
and decline. The growth phase is similar to  the Fisher-Pry binary logistic 
substitution, but it usually terminates before full substitution is reached. 
It is followed by the saturation phase which is not logistic, but which en- 
compasses the slowing of growth and the beginning of decline. After the 
saturation phase of a technology, its market share proceeds to  decline 
logistically. 
We assume that only one technology is in the saturation phase at any 
given time, that declining technologies fade away steadily at logistic rates 
uninfluenced by competition from new technologies, and that new tech- 
nologies enter the market and grow at logistic rates. The current saturating 
technology is then left with the residual market share and is forced to  
follow a nonlogistic path that joins its period of growth to  its subsequent 
period of decline. After the current saturating technology has reached a 
logistic rate of decline, the next oldest technology enters its saturation 
phase and the process is repeated until all but the most recent technology 
are in decline. In effect, our model assumes that technologies that have 
already entered their period of market phaseout are not influenced by the 
introduction of new ones. Deadly competition exists between the saturating 
technology and all other technologies. 
3 A SIMPLIFIED ANALYTICAL TREATMENT 
Let us assume that there are n competing technologies ordered chrono- 
logically in the sequence of their appearance in the market, technology 1 
being the oldest and technology n the youngest. Over a certain historical 
interval we estimate the coefficients of the logistic functions for the 
technologies in the logistic substitution phases. Typical historical periods 
we have investigated range from 130 t o  20 years. The substitution process 
can be simulated, however, over any desired time interval which need not 
overlap with the historical period. Let us call the beginning of this interval 
tg and the end t ~ .  
After the coefficients have been estimated, either by ordinary least 
squares or by some other method, we have n equations: 
where i = 1, . . . , n and where ai and Pi are the estimated coefficients. 
Now we identify the saturating technology, j, as the oldest technology still 
increasing its market share. The market shares are then defined by: 
For j they are defined by 
$ ( t )  = 1 - 2 A(t )  
i # j  
At this time, technology j is in its saturation phase and all other technolo- 
gies are either growing or declining logistically. 
Now we need a criterion to identify the end of the saturation phase 
and the beginning of the decline of technology j, at which time the func- 
tion $ ( t )  will become logistic again on its way down and the burdens of 
saturation will fall on technology j + 1. To  establish this criterion, we use 
the properties of the function 
If $(t) were logistic, ~ ( t )  would be linear in t. However, for $(t) in its 
saturation stage, the function yi(t) has negative curvature, passes through 
a maximum where technology j has its greatest market penetration, and 
then decreases. The curvature diminishes for a time, indicating that 
$(t) is approaching the logistic form, but then, unless technology j is 
shifted into its period of decline, the curvature can begin to increase as 
newer technologies enter the market place. Phenomenological evidence 
from a number of substitutions suggests that the end of the saturation 
phase should be identified with the time when the ratio of the curvature 
of ~ ( t )  to its slope reaches its minimum value. We take this criterion 
as the final constraint in our generalization of the substitution model, 
and from it we determine the parameters for technology j in its logistic 
decline. 
In mathematical form, the criterion for termination of the saturation 
phase for technology j is 
y,!'(t)/yi(t) = minimum 
(note that y"  and y ' are both negative in the region of the minimum). When 
the minimum condition is satisfied, we call this time point ti+, , the time 
of the beginning of saturation for technology j + 1, and determine coeffi- 
cients a and for the declining phase of technology j from the relationships 
Then the next-oldest technology j + 1 enters its saturation phase, and the 
process is repeated until the last technology n enters its saturation phase, 
or the end of the time period t~ is encountered. 
These expressions determine the temporal relationships between the 
competing technologies. Only time t and the estimated coefficients ai and 
Pi extracted from historical data have been treated as independent variables. 
4 COMMENTS AND WARNINGS ON USING THE 
CHARTS FOR PREDICTION 
Logistic analysis has shown an unexpected capacity to organize historical 
data, in that the information relevant to the evolutionary behavior of energy 
systems is contained in very restricted time series. This provides a very 
sound basis for using it for prediction. However, a certain number of pre- 
cautions should be taken, or at least kept in mind when using the results. 
First of all, a new primary energy, like any new technology, is intro- 
duced first by drawing capital and resources from the industrial and 
economic environment. This "investment in faith" usually shows up with 
very fast rates of market penetration right at the beginning followed by a 
reflection period, after which speed is resumed in compliance with the 
market. As a new technology, now a new industry, has to walk on its own 
legs, its speed of penetration is always lower. This transition point, or kink 
in the curve, usually occurs by the time penetration has reached 2 or 3 
percent of the market. If this kink does not show up, one is left with the 
suspicion that it will occur later, so that the final rate of penetration has 
to  be guessed from other indicators. The most useful indicator is the time 
constant prevalent for other substitutions in the same system, and this is 
what we often use for our scenarios. 
In the energy field, natural gas has the tendency to  keep the boosted 
track up to even 10 percent of market penetration. This behavior merits 
further study as it may permit a better insight into the introduction 
period of a new technology. One of the possible explanations is that at 
the beginning, natural gas can fill an existing distribution infrastructure 
so that only trunk transportation has to  be provided during the initial 
phase. 
Secondly, the model does not predict the introduction of a new tech- 
nology. This limits the time horizon of forecasting. Analysis of numerous 
cases has shown that each system has a fairly stable time constant. For 
example, the time constant (time to go from 1 to 50 percent of the market 
share) for the introduction of a new energy source in the world is about 
100 years. Consequently, from the point of view of the competitors, not 
very much is going to  happen during the first 50 years of the introduction 
of a new technology. This offers much breathing space when we discuss 
the world. But prudence is advisable when we deal with a time constant 
of only 20 or 30 years, as we find for the FRG. 
The weakest point for the predictions over the next 50 years is the 
role of nuclear energy; we have a starting point for the curve, but we still 
cannot determine the slope. For that reason, we intentionally took prudent 
values, e.g., a penetration of only 6 percent for the world in the year 2000, 
backed by a slightly more optimistic value of 10 percent. At these levels 
of nuclear energy penetration, it is clear that the predictions of the future 
roles of the various sources of energy based on this model contradict 
most of the predictions in the current literature, which are mainly con- 
trolled by the much looser constraints of resource availability and political 
opportunity. 
The causal importance of resource availability is weakened by the 
fact that oil successfully penetrated the energy market when coal still had 
an enormous potential, just as coal had previously penetrated the market 
when wood still had an enormous potential. The causal importance of the 
political argument is weakened by the smooth substitution observed over 
a period of more than a century, when political moods changed quite fre- 
quently and drastically. Furthermore, the drastic changes in energy prices 
after 1973, even if of monopolistic origin, do not appear a sufficient cause 
to change the rates of substitution; similar price changes in the past did 
not affect them either. This has been so at least for the medium- and long- 
run, presumably because of rapid relative price re-adjustments between 
various energy sources. While this is only a hypothesis, which merits a 
deeper study, the very rapid price adjustments after recent oil price in- 
creases are well in tune with it. 
The most important predictions of our model that differ from those 
in the current literature are that there will be 
A relatively rapid phaseout of coal as a primary energy source 
A quite important role for natural gas in the next 50 years 
A neghgible role in the next 50 years for new sources such as geo- 
thermal energy, solar energy, and fusion because of the very long 
lead times intrinsic to the system 
The curious fact about the last point is that the flourish of very expensive re- 
search on these sources implies a fairly low discounting factor in decisions on 
the allocation of funds for energy R&D. This appears to be very wise, if not 
internally consistent, because the lead times of the systems are so long that 
nothing could be started rationally if higher discounting rates were used. 
These and many other predictions (like the compatibility of resources 
with demand), although extremely interesting, are not really part of our 
research task; our work is centered in the past, where we try to find order 
and which we try to understand rationally. 
5 THE EXAMPLES 
The aim of the experimental part is to  show the scope and power of the 
method by taking as many examples as possible from three different 
levels of aggregation: 
Primary energy inputs for the world as a whole 
Primary energy inputs for single nations or a cluster of nations 
Energy subsystems, such as electric utilities 
In total, we used 60 data bases to generate 300 examples for 30 different 
spatial and structural subsets of the world energy system. The goodness of 
fit was consistently high in all examples, so the cases reported here have 
been chosen mainly for didactic reasons. 
The United States is particularly well represented, largely because of 
the quality and detail of its statistics. We also made an effort to  have a 
good representation for the Federal Republic of Germany. If this research 
should be continued, collaboration with an institute for statistics would 
have a multiplicative effect on the results. 
To make the curves easy to  interpret, the substitution graphs are 
drawn using the transformation log[ f/(l - f )] versus time (f being the 
market share). This makes the top and bottom part of the graph very 
sensitive and this fact should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions 
only from an examination of the graphs. The graphs showing total energy 
consumption are drawn on either logarithmic or linear axes, or on both, 
depending on the dispersion of the data. 
World energy consumption is reported first in various forms to illus- 
trate and clarify our methods of logistic analysis. Our world statistical 
data base includes wood, coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy as the 
major energy sources of history. 
Historical data on the consumption of coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear 
energy from 1860 to 1974 were taken from Schilling and Hildebrandt 
(1977), and data on fuel wood consumption were taken from Putnam 
(1953). Although fuel wood consumption levels for the years 1950 to 
1974 were not available, during this period the use of fuel wood was not 
very large so that any error thus introduced is not significant. All energy 
sources have been expressed in terms of their energy content in tons of 
coal equivalent (tce); 1 tce equals 7 million kcal. 
Nuclear energy was not available directly as primary equivalent but in 
gigawatt hours of electricity (GWh(e)). We have converted nuclear electric 
energy into tce of nuclear energy on the basis of an overall thermal-to- 
electric conversion rate of 33 percent. 
The energy inputs for the world are plotted here in billions of tce 
according to primary energy form. Many features related to economic or 
political events appear in the figure, but no consistent patterns are visible. 
Initial growth of new sources appears to be exponential. The smoothness 
of the line for wood raises suspicion and points to artificial estimation 
methods used to generate the original wood consumption time series. 
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When wood is included with the commercial energy sources, the 
development of world energy consumption appears fairly regular until 
World War 11, with a growth of 2.2 percent per year. After 1950, not only 
were the losses reabsorbed that occurred as a consequence of the great 
recession, but some overshooting occurred with respect to the trend line. 
This may have been caused by an increase in the rate of population growth 
after the war. The increase in energy costs may well temper this rate again. 
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New sources appear to  grow with exponential trends. Therefore, we 
plotted them in semilogarithmic form. The presence of some straight lines 
indicates that we are moving in the right direction, but we still do not find 
consistent general trends allowing a precise mathematical description of 
the evolution of the use of the various primary energy sources. 
I(RU1 - PRIMARY ENERGY SOBSTITUTION 
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Here the contributions of the various primary sources are shown 
as fractions of the total market. The smooth curves are two-parameter 
logistics assembled in a system of equations as described in the text. 
The fitting appears perfect for historical data. 
When we look to the future, the figure contains two primary energy 
sources for which a complete fitting of the parameters was not possible. 
For nuclear energy the present penetration is still too low to determine 
the slope of the penetration. We have estimated the rate from progress to 
date and from official plans. For SOLar or Fusion, the scenario is com- 
pletely hypothetical. Because rates of penetration were almost the same 
for coal, oil, and gas, we assumed an equal rate for nuclear and SOLFUS, 
in the spirit of "business as usual." The unexpected dominance of natural 
gas over the next 50 years will be discussed later in the report. 
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The curves of the preceding figure are now plotted as log[ f/(l - f )I ; 
the logistic curves appear as straight lines, greatly helping visual inspection 
and formal considerations. The first fact to  be observed is the extreme 
. regularity and slowness of the substitution. It takes about 100 years to  go 
from 1 percent to  50 percent of the market. We call this length of time 
the time constant of the system. 
The regularity refers not only to  the fact that the rate of penetration 
(defined as constant a in the equation and corresponding to  the slope of 
the curves) remains constant over such very long periods when so many 
perturbing processes seem to take place, but also to  the fact that all per- 
turbations are reabsorbed elastically without influencing the trend. It is as 
though the system had a schedule, a will, and a clock. 
It is also interesting to note that no source finally saturates the mar- 
ket, although nuclear may do so if it is not followed by something else. 
The dynamics of the introduction of new sources and the high time constant 
lead to  maximum penetrations of 60 to  70 percent. This is also true for 
most smaller systems, as will be shown later. 
Nuclear achieved only a 1-percent share of primary energy in the 
tarly 1970s; thus its future penetration rate cannot be distilled from the 
historical data. In 1977, installed nuclear capacity reached 88 GW(e) 
[IAEA 1977). Taking an overall utilization factor of 75 percent, the 
nuclear share in primary energy consumption is about 2 percent. 
By 1990, according to  the IAEA (1977), power plants currently 
under construction and planned should be in service; thus, the total in- 
stalled capacity should be at least 430 GW(e). With a rough utilization 
factor of 75 percent, this corresponds to  a 5- to  10-percent share in 1990, 
jepending on whether we use a 2-percent or a 3-percent growth rate of 
primary energy during the next 12 years. We have chosen a more modest 
nuclear share to  account for possible delays in the construction of the 
planned power plants: our nuclear scenario prescribes a 6-percent nuclear 
share in the year 2000. Note that the introduction of SOLFUS in the year 
2000 would not influence nuclear until around 2050. 
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As available statistics are sometimes unreliable, have gaps lasting for 
long periods of time, or refer t o  certain energy sources and not t o  others, 
we have tried to  check the stability of the fitted functions and of the 
forecasts with respect to  restrictions in the information base. The results 
are very encouraging, showing that the relevant information can be 
extracted from relatively short data swaths. 
Each curve in our system can be fitted with only two points, since 
only two points are needed to define a straight line. Consequently, the 
large number of statistical data serve only to reduce noise. However, 20 
years of data already constitute an excellent base. We have tried, then, to  
reconstruct all the periods under examination, using only a time series of 
20 years, between 1900 and 1920. This base has the disadvantage that gas 
has reached only a Zpercent share and consequently its long-term substi- 
tution rate may not yet be established. 
The smooth curves fitted to the 1900-1920 data still show an extra- 
ordinary agreement with the data outside the historical period. Natural gas 
deviates somewhat and there is an error in the "prediction" of about 7 
percentage points at the end of the period. This may seem relatively large, 
but it is a prediction made 50 years ahead from a small market share, and 
with a depression and a war in between! 
Because the model does not predict the introduction of new primary 
energy sources, nuclear does not appear at all in these projections. Yet the 
absence of nuclear was of no consequence for the 50 years from 1920 to  
1970, and, as shown in the previous figure, nuclear will be of little conse- 
quence for the other energy sources until it penetrates 5-10 percent of 
the market in about 2000. 
These observations are of the greatest importance since they give 
logical support t o  the use of our system of equations for projections into 
the future. In the lower figure, superposing the curves fitted on a short 
data base with those fitted on the complete data base shows the relatively 
small differences. Additionally, whenever the timing and penetration rates 
of future technologies must be estimated, as for nuclear and SOLFUS, the 
system of equations serves t o  establish internal consistency for each 
scenario. 
Superposition of the curves calculated with the short data base (solid 
lines) and the extended data base (dashed lines) shows the remarkable 
predictive ability of the short data base over a period of half a century, 
and illustrates the gradual accumulation of errors. 
FRACTION (FI 
This experiment shows that much information about the total system 
can be extracted from a structural subset. From the complete data base, 
we had the impression that wood statistics were too smooth to be accurate, 
and in a certain measure represent educated guesses of the statistical 
offices. Consequently, we omitted wood and analyzed the competitive 
behavior of the other primary sources left in the market. As the figure 
shows, the logistic description fits the subset perfectly. In the following 
figure, the curves with and without wood are superposed, to show that 
little information is lost when wood statistics are eliminated. 
To better appreciate the level of the errors made by eliminating fuel 
wood data, we superposed the two sets of curves. The differences never 
went beyond a few percent of the market, showing that key information 
about the dynamics of the market is contained in and can be extracted 
from restricted subsets of the original data base. 
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The history of nuclear energy is too short and the market penetration 
of nuclear energy is too small to  provide a reliable indication of the long- 
term market penetration rate. We made a sensitivity analysis t o  explore 
the consequences of this uncertainty. A plot with a nuclear energy share 
of 6 percent in the year 2000 and one with a 10-percent share in the year 
2000, almost doubling the rate, are superposed. 
This figure reveals very interesting properties of the logistic competi- 
tion. Primary fuels on their way down are insensitive t o  a change in the 
rate of newcomers. After the great fuss about nuclear energy tramping into 
the garden of coal, and coal being reshaped as a tool t o  stamp out nuclear, 
this appears very refreshing, if unexpected. 
Nuclear appears to interact strongly only with naturalgas, presumably 
preempting the markets into which it could have expanded, and interacts 
only marginally with oil, which may disappoint those who install nuclear 
power stations to reduce their need for oil imports. The problem of resource 
availability that automatically comes t o  mind is not dealt with here. It 
appears, however, that the substitution mechanism itself takes care of it. 
Actually, leftovers seem a stable characteristic of the operation. 
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This figure shows the total energy consumption for Germany from 
1870 until 1949 and for the FRG from 1950 until 1970. The fluctuations 
between the two world wars cover a perfect stagnation. It is interesting, if 
perhaps accidental, that the curve after 1950 matches exactly that before 
1910 with the same values and the same growth rate of 4.3 percent. The 
data after 1950, however, refer to  the FRG only. 
The original data for the period 1870- 1974 are taken from Schilling 
and Hildebrsndt (1977), and the data for 1975 and 1976 were calculated 
on the basis of energy flow diagrams for the FRG given in Kernforschungs- 
adage Jiilich ( 1 977) for 1 97 5 and by Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizi- 
tatswerke (1978). 
Data on fuel wood consumption from 1870 to 1950 were taken from 
Putnam (1953) and were converted from British thermal units (Btu) to  
tons of coal equivalent (tce). No data on wood were available for the last 
three decades, but during this time wood has had only a marginal share of 
the market. Nuclear energy inputs, given in gigawatts of electricity (GW(e)) 
in IAEA (1977), were converted into tce, with a thermal-toelectric con- 
version efficiency of 33 percent and a utilization factor of 75 percent. 
The evolution of energy consumption for Germany and the FRG is 
shown here for the various primary energy sources, in linear form (top) 
and in semilogarithmic form (bottom), to emphasize the startup periods. 
Although a war, a depression, another war, and a partition have had major 
impacts on total energy consumption, they have had relatively little effect 
on market shares of the various energy sources, as shown in the following 
figures. 
FRG - P R I M  PaRGY SUBSTITUTION 
The logistic analysis is reported here f i s t  with wood and then without 
wood. Since wood statistics tend to be unreliable, they are eliminated to  
avoid a possible source of perturbation. In both cases, the scene appears 
fully dominated by coal before World War 11. The sudden jump of oil t o  3 
percent in the thirties from a stationary 1 percent is unexplained and could 
merit further analysis. It may have something to  do with preparation for 
the war. Between 1945 and 1972, substitution proceeded very smoothly 
and logistically, with oil becoming dominant with a fairly short time con- 
stant of about 25 years, and gas promising the same performance in a sus- 
piciously short period of 15 years. The peaking of oil consumption around 
1973 in relative and absolute terms could have been precisely predicted 
with data up t o  1965. Thus, it cannot be attributed to  the oil crisis but 
must result from forces internal to  the economy of the FRG. There are, 
however, two uncertainties hidden in this straightforward projection. First, 
by analogy with the UK, Belgium, and, up to  a point, France, natural gas 
can continue the fast initial trend beyond the usual 2 or 3 percent before 
it slows down to  its steady penetration rate. No such kink for gas appears 
in the curve for the FRG. It is possible that the kink may appear later, in 
which case we will have overestimated its long-term penetration rate. 
Second, the nuclear penetration rate was estimated on the basis of 
historical data. However, due t o  its relatively low share of primary energy 
(2.2 percent in 1976) we have checked this penetration rate t o  see that it 
corresponds t o  the number of power plants currently under construction 
and those planned for the future. The IAEA (1977) gives a total installed 
capacity of 21 GW(th) in 1977 for the FRG; an additional 34.3 GW(th) 
are now under construction and will be in commercial operation by 1982; 
and another 65.9 GW(th) are planned by 1985. Taking a rough utilization 
factor of 75  percent over this period, these plans would indicate approxi- 
mately 40  million tce nuclear primary energy equivalent in 1982 and 90 
million tce in 1985. Our nuclear penetration rate with a total primary 
energy consumption growth rate of 4.3 percent per year gives a nuclear 
primary share of 30  million tce in 1982 and 50 million tce in 1985. Thus, 
our nuclear penetration rate can be characterized as being somewhat pes- 
simistic on the basis of current plans, and presumably realistic as a lower 
limit on the future role of nuclear energy in the FRG. The true fate of 
nuclear should be revealed in the next 10 years. 
A SOLar or  FUSion (SOLFUS) scenario has been introduced for the 
year 2000, with a penetration rate equal to  that of nuclear energy. This 
keeps the system evolutionary and gives an idea about the ultimate effect 
of the next source on nuclear. Altogether, the FRG appears t o  behave 
normally but more dynamically than systems of similar size and structure, 
such as France or the UK. 
FRG - PRIMARY ENERGY SWSTITUTION 
As the statistics on fuel wood are often unreliable, we have eliminated 
wood and analyzed how the other fuels share the market for commercial 
energy sources. Oil remains at a level of 1 percent for half a century and 
shows again that actual logistic market penetration does not start until 
the market has been penetrated by a few percent. An extraordinary feature 
of the predictive side of the graph is that oil as a primary source of energy 
will virtually disappear in the year 2000, a feature common to the UK, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium. If this happens to be true, what will auto- 
mobiles run on? Perhaps on LNG, Hz, or methanol. 
The overwhelming predominance of coal in the German economy prior 
to  1950 is illustrated again in these linear-logistic plots of the same substitu- 
tion processes shown in the previous two figures. The upper plot includes 
wood and the lower plot does not. 
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Coal and lignite are usually lumped together in statistics, although, 
like oil and gas, they are technologically, logistically, and structurally 
different enough to be considered separately. For the FRG, data are 
available to treat them independently, which we do in these figures. We 
also include hydropower, converted to its fuel equivalent by assuming the 
appropriate thermal power plant efficiency. This separation of the data 
appears fruitful. Hydropower shrinks in importance, while lignite has its 
own precise trend and appears to overtake coal in the late eighties. Can it 
be a source o f  fuel for cars, perhaps via methanol? 
In the same way as we supposed that primary energies are technolo- 
gies competing for a market, we also assumed that secondary energies 
behave in the same fashion. The analysis is based on historical data from 
Sassin ( 1 977). 
The left-hand figure shows the market shares of solids (coke, coal, 
and lignite), liquids (mostly heating oils), and distribution grids (electricity, 
gas, and hot water) to ultimate consumers in homes, offices, and factories 
(i-e., excluding the transportation segment of the economy). The right-hand 
figure shows how the three grid technologies compete among themselves 
for the overall grid market, revealing a great future for district heating, 
unless a new system is available in the next 20 years. 

The relatively short data base permits reasonable curves to  be fitted. 
A longer time series would not really help since before 1950 electricity 
came almost exclusively from coal. The visual impression from the garble 
of curves is that the FRG electricity industry is undergoing a very fast 
transformation, with nuclear finally replacing coal in its dominant role 
with a time constant of about 20 years. If we try t o  make predictions, oil 
and gas appear to  fill a transitory gap. Hydropower is phased out of the 
market simply as a result of market expansion. 
As nuclear is most suited to baseload generation, having very low 
marginal costs, a question arises about the utilization of part-time capacity 
available when this baseload is saturated, which seems to  occur in the mid- 
.: eighties. It is not improbable that this nlay spur the production of synthetic 
fuels from nuclear energy, and make the disappearance of oil a little more 
plausible. 
In order to  cross-check the consistency of the relatively fast phaseout 
of coal and lignite in the primary inputs, and the relatively more sluggish 
disappearance in the electricity industry, we made a check with the assump- 
tion that the share of primary energy going into electricity production in 
the year 2000 will be less than 50 percent. This is not illustrated here, but 
the projections are consistent. 
Data for electricity generation by primary energy source from 1950 
to  1974 were taken from Atomwirtschaft-Atomtechnik (1976). Data 
from 1950 to 1958 were only estimates; thus, we did not use them. The 
original data are given in gigawatt hours of electricity output. For the pur- 
pose of comparison with primary energy consumption, we have converted 
the data into millions of tons of coal equivalent. However, this conversion 
is not very exact since we did not account for the different efficiencies of 
various fuels. Instead, we have taken an overall average efficiency for all 
inputs. The errors resulting from the approximate conversion to  million 
tce are small. Data for 1975 and 1976 were taken directly from Rheinisch- 
Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerke (1978) and Kernforschungsanlage Jiilich 
(1977) in millions of tons of coal equivalent. 
Two sets of data were used for analysis of the substitution dynamics 
of primary energy for France. The first set is from Weitsch (1 976) and was 
available for the period 1900 to  1974. The second set comes from the 
OECD (1 976). Time series for coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear are reported 
in millions of tons of coal equivalent for the period of 1960 to 1974. Oil 
data contain crude oil and petrochemical products. The agreement of the 
data sets for the overlapping period of 1960 to 1974 is very good. The 
first data set is illustrated here in linear and semilog form to amplify the 
starting period. The second data set is considered later in the report. 
This example of primary energy substitution indicates that France 
will manage a relatively smooth transition without the very problematic 
issues seen in the examples for the FRG. Oil was introduced much earlier 
and will be phased out later, leaving more breathing space for a decision 
on automobile fuels. The dependence on oil has reached a maximum level 
of about two-thirds of the total energy consumption. This presumably has 
greatly stimulated the decisions in favor of the nuclear option; nuclear 
penetration, however, seems to be slightly slower than in the FRG. Natural 
gas, which started its career at approximately the same time as in the FRG, 
may then last a little longer and play the same important role around the 
year 1990. The very fast growth of natural gas up to about 7 percent of 
I the market might be interpreted as the manifestation of an intensive 
external support (by the state?), a hypothesis that is yet to be verified. 
A peculiarity of the curves is the twist corresponding to  World War 11. 
I 
Everything would fit again if we assume that the French system hibernated 
during the military occupation, and if we "cancel" the 5 years that it 
lasted. From the linear-logistic plot, France seems to  be a much less dy- 
namic system than the FRG. Time constants are in fact about 50 years. 
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As there are so many uncertainties facing the deployment of nuclear 
energy in the next decade, which is so critical for defining the pace for the 
rest of its penetration, we made a sensitivity study adopting two other 
plausible hypotheses. As expected, the penetration of gas is strongly related 
to that of nuclear, but even oil is strongly influenced. It can be deduced 
that nuclear is really a hot point in the energy policies of France. 
Nuclear energy controlled more than a 2-percent share of primary 
energy in 1972 after 2 years of very steep growth from a 1-percent share 
in 1970. This corresponded to 9.7 GW(th) installed capacity reported by 
the IAEA (1 977) for 1972. According to the same source, additional plants 
with a total of 58.2 GW(th) installed capacity are under construction, 
with commercial operation expected by 198 1. Together, this makes a total 
of 68 GW(th) installed capacity by 198 1. Assuming a very high historical 
growth rate of energy consumption of 5.6 percent per year (1960 to 1974) 
and a power plant tltilization factor of 75 percent, the nuclear share will 
be about 14 percent of primary energy in 1981. This calculation shows 
extremely rapid nuclear construction rates, and if we assume a lower 
energy demand during the next decade, the nuclear share would be even 
higher. If historical rates for other substitutions also apply for nuclear, its 
penetration would be much slower: 8 percent in 1980. We used that rate 
in our scenario, which therefore should be considered a very prudent one. 
U - PRIMARY ENERGY ~ T I T u T I D (  
Historical data on consumption levels of coal, oil, natural gas, and 
nuclear energy for the United Kingdom come from three sources. The period 
of 1860 to 1950 has been taken from Putnam (1953), from 1950 to 1974 
from Ormerod (1 976), and 1975 and 1976 from the UK Department of 
Energy (1976, 1977). Data from Ormerod, however, are reported as frac- 
tional shares and therefore absolute levels are not plotted here. According 
to Putnam, fuel wood has never been an important energy source in the 
UK except for some use of charcoal. It is not considered in our analysis. 
The primary energy substitution is marked by the dominance of coal 
in the energy market during the last century. Even in 1950, it still con- 
tributed 90 percent of primary energy consumption. From 1950 on, the 
substitution proceeded at high rates. By 1970, oil already controlled a 
50-percent share, and natural gas had 10 percent, starting at 1 percent in 4 
1968. However, the natural gas penetration curve has a kink in 1970, 
which we assume to be indicative of smaller substitution rates to be ob- 
served in the future. The very high pre-1970 trend could be explained by I 
the already-existing gas distribution network being fed by city gas, i.e., 
mainly from coal, which natural gas simply took over and saturated by 
1970, so it did not face the usual growth limitations of a new technology. 
Therefore, we use only points after 1969 to  estimate the natural gas 
penetration trend. 
FRACTION (F) 
This plot shows that although nuclear energy in the UK had a very 
fast start in 1964, later it slowed down considerably. Today there are 
24 GW(th) of installed nuclear capacity, which at the current utilization 
rate is about 4 percent of primary energy consumption. Additional plants 
with a combined capacity of 9 GW(th) are under construction and expected 
to be in commercial operation by 1979. Another 3.23 GW(th) from nuclear 
plants are planned by 1986. This makes a total of 36.3 GW(th) installed 
capacity to be available by 1986. With a utilization factor of 75 percent 
and the current growth rate in energy consumption of 3 percent per year, 
this would give a 7-percent market share by 1986; we assumed 6 percent. 

The historical data on primary energy consumption in the United 
States since 1860 were taken from Schilling and Hildebrandt (1977) for 
coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy. All data were reported in millions 
of tons of coal equivalent except nuclear energy. Nuclear consumption 
rates were reported in millions of kilowatt hours, and we converted them 
to million tce. 
The fuel wood time series come from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(1 975a) for the period from 1860 to  1970. The wood consumption after 
1970 was neglibible; thus, it was not necessary to add the last few years. 
The source we used for the data on wood from 1860 to  1945 was Schurr 
et al. (1960), who in turn used two different sources: from 1850 to 1930, 
Reynolds and Pierson (1942), and from 1935 to  1955, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (1958). Thus, the discontinuity in the penetration rate of 
fuel wood in the 1930s could be attributed to discrepancies between the 
two sources. 
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The logistic analysis again makes order out of the mess of statistical 
data. Substitution appears to  move extremely smoothly until 1920 (facing 
page, top), in agreement with other economic indicators. Coal peaks around 
that date and oil at the beginning of the 1960s, 40 years later. As early as 
1900, both peaks could have been predicted with good precision; conse- 
quently, they are not linked to forthcoming events like wars or embargos. 
Here, as in all the other cases examined, embargos and large price increases 
actually produced disproportionately small dents in the curves. The devia- 
tion in the lowest part of the wood curve is connected to a change in the 
statistical source, and most probably due to  a change in the accounting 
and estimating method. 
At the bottom of the facing page is a log-logistic plot of primary 
energy substitution in the United States. One thing left to  be explained is 
the sudden rise in oil production, much above the trend line, essentially 
during the depression years. This rise induced a corresponding low share 
of coal, but it did not affect gas. The analysis should perhaps look deeper 
into the possibility that rapid introduction of automobiles may have caused 
the perturbation. The striking fact in the process, however, is that after a 
while, the perturbation was reabsorbed and the secular trend resumed in 
1940, 20 years later! This again points to a system memory and clocks! 
Contrary to all other predictions, natural gas appears t o  be the domi- 
nating energy source for the next 50 years, which leads to  the question 
whether the United States will import more natural gas in the form of 
LNG, increase imports from Canada and Mexico, or whether the numerous 
less accessible sources, like geopressurized zones, will be exploited. 
The nuclear market share in the United States was about 3 percent of 
the primary energy in 1974 and about 5 percent in 1977. This, however, 
may still not be enough to determine the long-telm trend of nuclear pene- 
tration rates. By 1990, there should be about 61 0 GW(th) installed capacity. 
This estimate is based on the power plants currently under construction 
and those planned to be in service by 1990 (IAEA 1977). With the long- 
term energy consumption growth of 3 percent per year, this would imply 
a 15-percent share in 1990, assuming an overall utilization factor of 75 
percent. To account for all possible delays, we assumed a 10-percent share 
by the year 2000 in our nuclear scenario. 
We have also included an alternative future energy source (SOLar- 
Fusion) that enters the market in 1990 with the same penetration rate as 
nuclear. There is no basis whatsoever for this assumption, except that a 
new source could not reach a 1-percent market share before then. As in 
the world case, a change in the rate of penetration of nuclear will not 
change the situation of oil, and only after the year 2000 will it change 
that of natural gas. 
Key : 
CUT/SHOT - cut by hand and shot from solid 
CONTINU. - mined by continuous mining machines 
LONGWALL - mined by longwall machines 
MACHINES - cut by machines 
AUGER - mined at Auger mines 
SURFACE - from surface mines 
The evolution of mining techniques in the United States is examined 
here. It is a very appropriate field for logistic substitution analysis. In these 
two figures, the amount of coal extracted according to the various tech- 
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Due to the increasing dominance of strip mining, the competition 
between strip mining and underground mining is dealt with explicitly (see 
facing page). A check of the total amount extracted shows that the sharp 
kink in the logistic plot is due to a sudden drop in deep mining production. 
These sudden drops are not new in a socially turbulent structure like the 
U.S. mining industry, but this time it may be due to the introduction of 
stringent safety rules in the mines. Most probably, the perturbation will 
be reabsorbed in a few years. If not, deep mining would disappear in the 
United States in 1980, a very unlikely if not impossible occurrence. Strip 
mining legislation seems to  bring in the corrective reaction. 
As deep mining presents such an array of competing technologies, it 
is interesting to analyze their struggle, leaving out all surface mining tech- 
niques except Auger, which could be considered as both underground and 
surface technology. The longwall technology becomes dominant in the 
next 20 years, winning the last battle of a lost war, as underground mining 
seems bound to disappear in about 50 years. 
With ups and downs, coal production in the United States stayed 
constant over the last 50 years at a level of about 0.5 lo9 tonslyear. 
Since the phaseout of coal in the United States is a slow process, during 
the next 20 years, the U.S. mining industry should equip longwall mines 
for production that is slightly larger than the total production of FRG 
coal mines now. The abbreviations are defined on page 42. 
When we view the system through dynamically competing subsystems, 
we may think that different branches o f  the economy compete for the 
same resource, a statement much in line with the Weltanschauung of 
economists and laymen. In this spirit, we made a logistic analysis of the 
shares of natural gas consumption of three large parts of the U.S. economy: 
the industrial, the residential, and the commercial. 
It appears that the small consumers are gradually winning a larger 
share of natural gas, which is quite reasonable in view of how simple it is 
to  use and how little it pollutes. The process of competition, however, 
appears to  have long time constants, and only in the year 2050 will the 





Reversing the previous reasoning, one can think that the various forms 
of energy compete for a certain sector. In this case, it is the household- 
commercial sector. 
M I L L *  U M  UIU* KWH 
The electrical utility market is very important for primary energy 
producers. It is large, fairly homogeneous, highly technological, and rather 
profitable. Therefore, it is a good test-bed for observing the progress of 
new technologies. In these two figures, we plotted the evolution during 
the last 25 years of the production of electricity according to  the various 
primary fuels, both in linear and semilog form. 
The historical data on electricity generation according to  primary 
energy fuels in millions of kilowatt hours (kwh), as well as the data on 
primary energy consumption for electricity production in billions of 
British thermal units used later in this report, have been taken from the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 1976, 1977). The two data sets show 
implicitly the relative conversion efficiencies for electricity generation 
according to the various energy inputs used. 
USA - aECTRICIlY BY PRIMARY INPUTS 
Electricity generated using coal, oil, or gas is shown here in a logistic 
representation. This is an indirect way of showing the competition of the 
various primary energies. 
lo- 1 1 
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Here the competition is expressed more explicitly in terms of millions 
of tons of coal equivalent (tce) of different fuels entering the electricity 
market. It is clear that coal has been under constant attack by oil and gas, 
which have progressively eroded its position. A perturbation appears in 
the period from 1955 to 1970, showing an excessive consumption of gas 
with respect to oil. This may appear strange since during this period oil 
was "cheap and abundant." But in the United States, gas was still cheaper 
because of stringent price regulation. Oil recovers, however, and regains its 
position from 1973 to 1974! 




The substitution of different primary inputs in electricity generation 
is discontinuous when nuclear enters the market with a powerful drive and 
phases out oil and gas before the end of the century (facing page, top). Coal 
appears perfectly unperturbed and finally dictates the pace of introduction 
of nuclear from 1980 on. It is interesting, even if a little shocking, that 
this pace had been finally determined by the penetration rates of oil and 
gas in the twenties. Many problems surface from the expected structure of 
the system in the next 20 years. For example: What kind of peaking system 
will be provided? Will it be through medium-Btu gas from coal and gas 
turbines or through storage? 
The lower figure on the facing page reports the same results but in 
linear terms in order to make it easy to interpret. Connected with the fast 
substitution of nuclear energy in the electricity market is the possibility of 
f 
a kink in the nuclear penetration curve during the coming years, leading to  
lower market substitution and a smooth transition. 

When the nuclear energy penetration of the market is plotted starting 
with a market share lower than the 1-percent share reached in 1967, no 
change of the substitution rates can be observed; in most other examples, 
nuclear energy and natural gas stabilize to  a slower penetration rate once 
they take a few percent of the market (e.g., for nuclear energy see pages 
3 1, 33, and 36, and for natural gas see pages 33, 36, 63, and 66). Assuming 
that this kink will occur before the end of this decade, we observe higher 
natural gas and oil shares, and coal remains unaffected. The nuclear share 
in the year 2000 is more than halved to about 30 percent. This slower 
penetration of nuclear energy has been determined by a scenario based on 
the nuclear share in 1976 and the expected share in 1990 calculated from 
the nuclear installed capacity under construction and the planned power 
plants (610 GW(th); see page 41), and the historical growth of the elec- 
tricity market at 6.2 percent per year. The result is sensitive to  the value 





The data come from the OECD (1976). We made a logistic analysis 
for the European OECD states lumped together and for some of the states 
separately. The data base is relatively short, 15 years, but the curves appear 
very stable. The overall OECD case is presented here. 
*Austria, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Finland, France, FRG, Greece, Iceland, Ireland. Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. 
The logistic analysis for OECD is presented here in the log and linear 
form. Coal and oil behave very regularly. Natural gas has prolonged the 
start-up vagaries up to  10 percent of the market. The fact that it shows a 
penetration rate virtually identical to that of oil is a sign that tends to 
confum the good quality of the projections. Nuclear has penetrated only 
to 2 percent; consequently, the projection is still somewhat uncertain. Any 
change in rate, however, would not change the projection that gas will 
become the next dominant primary energy source. 
Two facts emerge; one is that natural gas, with a penetration rate 
much similar to that of oil, appears to  be the primary source in the year 
2000. It appears to  drive oil to  an impressively low level of 10 percent in 
that year. Second, the curve for nuclear seems quite regular, although the 
definition of the final substitution rate is still open owing to  the current 
low level of penetration. With the present rate, nuclear would reach a 
somewhat unimpressive share of 10 percent of the market in the year 2000, 
leaving Europe completely dependent on hydrocarbons. SOLFUS has not 
been included as a scenario. It would possibly make nuclear saturate the 
market during the fust half of the next century. 
A I S T R I A  - PRIMARY E E S Y  UWULIPTIDi 
The primary energy consumption for Austria displays minimal dis- 
persion except for rapid growth in oil consumption. Hydropower has been 
included in the set of primary energies because it is quite an important 
energy source for Austria. The market appears dominated by oil, with 
natural gas still low but increasing fast. 
On the facing page, the data are presented in the log and linear 
logistic format. In the first row, no new sources are introduced. This may 
not have many consequences before the year 2000 because the time con- 
stant of the country appears to be so large (about 100 years). The situation 
with respect to nuclear is extremely confused. One power station was built 
but is not in operation owing to  a referendum. No second power station 
is in sight, but nuclear electricity is being imported from neighboring 
countries. 
The figures in the second row should then be considered as a sensitivity 
analysis indicating the potenti,al influence of nuclear energy on the other 
primary sources. If we hypothesize a 4-percent penetration in the year 
2000, the medium-term effect would be a slight reduction of oil imports. 
Gas consumption would be affected only after 2020. Only an improbable, 
very fast nuclear penetration could make Austria reasonably independent 
of oil in the next 30 years. 












Without logistic analysis, the data on primary energy consumption in 
Belgium suggest that oil is the dominant primary energy, with no limits to 
its future (upper figure on the facing page). Coal is rapidly phasing out 
and gas is phasing in. Nuclear is barely perceptible (in 1974). 
In the lower figure, logistic analysis reveals the hidden order. Although 
the data cover a short period of time, the good quality of the fit gives 
weight to the following considerations. 
Coal seems to  disappear around the year 2000, which is more or less 
in line with the ideas in the country. Oil, including the trade balance in oil 
products, peaks around 1973 and seems to phase out in 1990. This predic- 
t tion, which, by the way, repeats itself in a similar form for the Netherlands, 
the FRG, and the UK, is a bit hard to swallow on technical grounds. How 
will cars run in 1995? Will they use increasing amounts of methanol pro- 
duced from coal and natural gas? This would in fact preserve their com- 
patibility with gasoline, necessary at least for long-distance traveling. If 
coal is the primary source, a new curve may be required for underground 
coal gasification, i.e., for new coal. Electric, hydrogen- or methanol-electric, 
and pure hydrogen cars are in principle possible, but do not seem very 
probable in this time period. 
We could also have overestimated the rate of penetration for gas. 
External interests prop up the penetration of a new technology at  very 
high rates, usually until it has penetrated a few percent of the market. One 
could make the hypothesis that a particularly favorable environment, in 
this case the prior existence of an efficient distribution net for gas, and 
the spacial concentration of population, has prolonged this initial stage up 
to  10 percent. Yet, a change in the penetration rate from that point would 
only delay the disappearance of oil by a few years. A similar tampering 
with the rate of penetration of nuclear, which is still fairly hypothetical 
because of many lingering doubts, shows other possible small gains, but is 
not really decisive. So the problem is substantially left open. If we believe 
in the predictive capacity of our methodology, something fairly drastic 
will occur in the automotive field during the next 20 years, and the focal 
i area will be in Belgium, the Netherlands, or the FRG. 
Primary energy consumption in the Netherlands is here reported by 
primary source, in linear and semilog form t o  stress the starting period. No 
particular tendency emerges; coal is phasing out and oil is phasing in. Gas 
made a very fast inroad after the discovery of the Groningen field. Nuclear 
is just emerging. 
The logistic analysis shows here a quite precise structure. Coal is 
bound to disappear in 1980 and oil in 1990, opening the question about 
cars discussed already in the case of Belgium. The problem of nuclear is 
perfectly open and our scenario is pure guessing. It must be clear that if 
nuclear electricity is imported in spite of antinuclear opposition, nuclear 
should still be included in the energy budget. However, since natural gas 
has such a dominating role, the rate of introduction of nuclear energy will 
have little influence on the fate of oil. Thus, the car question is left open. 
Seen in the light of our analysis, the Netherlands' alternatives appear 
to be natural gas or nuclear, and, thus, one understands better the impor- 
tance of the debate about nuclear energy. 
The primary energy substitution for France is repeated here using 
OECD data sources. The result is substantially the same as on page 33, 
although different data and a shorter data base are used, which leads to 
minor discrepancies in the long run. For the nuclear scenario we estimated 
an &percent penetration in 1980, which comes from the fitting of the 
data, although the current market share is still below 2 percent. However, 
nuclear energy is growing fast in France and the situation should become 
clear in a few years. 
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The primary energy substitution for the UK is repeated here using 
OECD data. In spite of some discrepancies with other data sources, the 
predictions differ only in relatively small details from those on page 36. 
Even if nuclear should penetrate the market more rapidly, it would p r e  
duce only a small dent in the dominance of gas during the next several 
decades. 
ITALY - PRIMARY mGY r n S U I P T I M  
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The primary energy consumption (left) and substitution (right) for 
Italy are shown here with a 1 5-year OECD data base. The penetration of 
nuclear energy (10 percent by the year 2000) is hypothetical and based 
on the assumption that Italy will not be very different in that respect 
from other European OECD countries. 
The future appears very bright for gas to  reach dominance in the 
next decade. Although this is supported by the efforts to  link Italy with 
the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and North Africa, via a pipeline under 
the Mediterranean, it is certainly beyond the rosiest plans of the gas in- 
dustry. If we assume that gas growth was "forced" up to 10 percent and 
consequently fit the logistic with later data, and set nuclear penetration 
(improbably) as fast as gas, we reach a more acceptable but not very dif- 
ferent conclusion. 
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The primary energy consumption data for Canada do not show any 
particular pattern, except a very fast inroad of nuclear energy, although 
at a relatively low level. The logistic analysis reveals extremely smooth 
transitions, much similar to those of Austria, with time constants on the 
order of 70 to 80 years. In spite of Canadian devotion to nuclear energy, 
we drew a prudent scenario, assuming about 16-percent nuclear in the 
year 2000. As in most of the world, gas appears to  peak and become 
dominant in the year 2000. 
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The primary energy consumption data for Japan are taken from the 
OECD and cover the period 1960 to 1974 for coal, oil, natural gas, and 
nuclear; they are all expressed in millions of tons of coal equivalent (tce). 
The oil data include consumption of crude oil and petrochemical products. 
Nuclear is just beginning. Today there are 20 GW(th) of installed capacity 
(IAEA 1977), amounting to about 2 percent of primary equivalent. 
In spite of Japan's unique situation as a country with very large, 
recently developed industry linked to an almost complete dependence 
on imports, the primary energy substitution shows nothing very unusual. 
Coal is being replaced by oil, a trend begun after World War 11 that appears 
to end in the nineties. The dependence on oil is fundamental, but only a 
little higher than that of France and similar to that of Italy. Oil starts to 
saturate now, as the equations could have predicted (using data before the 
oil crisis!). According to the equations, oil should be phased out around 
2030, much later than for France or Italy. 
Gas enters the scene somewhat late, at the end of the sixties, perhaps 
because it has to be imported using the complex technology of LNG. Per- 
haps for the same reason it does not seem to play the same central role as 
in Europe or the United States. According to the equations, it should peak 
around the year 20 10, in consonance with the world peak. 
Nuclear is fairly hypothetical, although we have tried to use the 
various forecasts prudently. The isolated point near gas (see arrow) indi- 
cates the actual situation. With nuclear penetration reaching 10 percent in  
the nineties, the rate coincides with that of other fuels. Nuclear would 
then become dominant during the first half of the next century, even if a 
new source is introduced around the year 2000. 
Today there are 20 GW(th) of installed capacity (IAEA 1977), 
amounting in terms of primary equivalent to more than a 2-percent share. 
Additional plants with a total installed capacity of 27.6 GW(th) are under 
construction and should be in commercial operation by 1982. Another 
14.7 GW(th) are planned to be available by 1 984 (IAEA 1 977). Assuming 
that the long-term energy consumption growth prevails during the next 
decade and that the utilization factor is 75 percent, we project a nuclear 
share of about 7 percent by 1984. Our scenario of the long-term nuclear 
penetration rate assumes that licensing and political and construction 
problems will lead to delays. Thus, we predict a 7-percent share 4 years 
later in 1988. 
At the turn of the century, oil, gas, and nuclear appear to share the 
market equally, which implies an extraordinary advance in the technologies 
of transporting natural gas (or some derived products?) overseas and a 
virtual saturation of the electricity market by nuclear power stations. 
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